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From an analysis of the cases, it appears that the principal case is
distinguishable from the Hansen case, supra, for in that case the defendant intended to return to a legitintate occupation. In the Lapina
case, supra, as in the principal case, there was an intent to return to
an illegitimate occupation, and in this respect the cases are in point.
However, upon closer analysis, it appears that the principal case is
distinguishable from both cases relied upon by the court. Even though
the return trip was made to resume activities in an illegal profession,
still such return trip was a part of a larger planned journey, made with
no intent to facilitate the purposes of prostitution, debauchery, or other
immoral purposes. The primary objective of the entire trip was to
enjoy a vacation, and the return to the house of prostitution was merely
an incident thereto. It is submitted that the Supreme Court reached
the correct result.
CECIL J.HILL
Constitutional Law-Right of Women to Serve on Juries*
The defendant was convicted for violations of the Prohibition laws
by a jury consisting of ten men and two women. At the impaneling of
the jury in the trial court, the defendant objected to the two women on
the jury, but this objection was overruled. The defendant appealed on
the ground of disqualification because of sex; and, in a 5-2 decision, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina granted a new trial and ruled that
women were not eligible to serve on juries in this state.'
The majority based its decision on these points: (1) Constitutional
provisions regarding trial by jury2 * are to be construed according to
their meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1868,
at which time a common law jury excluded women propter defectum
4
sexus.3 (2) Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the statute,
* This topic has been discussed in many periodicals. The following formed
part of the bibliography for this note: Miller, The Woman Juror (1922) 2 ORE.
L. REV. 30; NotEs (1932) 12 B. V. L. REv. 122, (1925) 13 CALiF. L. REV. 155,
(1939) 18 CHii-KENT REV. 103, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 134, (1925) 25 COL. L.
REv. 376, (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 533, (1930) 18 GEo. L. J. 393, (1928) 22 ILL. L.
REV. 777, (1926) 21 IL.. L. REV. 292, (1927) 2 IND. L. J. 566, (1922) 7 IowA L.
BULL. 190, (1928) 32 LAW No'ms 124, (1923) 26 LAW NoTEs 224, (1921) 19
MicH. L. REV. 662, (1927) 12 Miro. L. REV. 81, (1921) 6 MiNN. L. R-v. 78,
(1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 318, (1930) 74 SoL. J. 510, (1937) 12 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 172, (1927) 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 138, (1932) 6 TULANE L. Ray. 324, (1937)
71 U. S. L. REv. 75, (1921) 69 U. of PA. L. REy. 386, (1920) 68 U. of PA. L.
REv. 398, (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 661, (1921) 8 VA. L. REV. 139, (1926) 35 YALE
L. J.887, (1919) 28 YALE L. J.515, (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 423.
' State v. Emery, 224 N. C. 581, 31 S. E. (2d) 858 (1944).
-* "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of
a jury of good and lawful men in open court." N. C. CONST. Art. I, §13. "No
person ought to be . . . deprived of his . .. liberty or property, but by the law
of the land." N. C. CON T. Art. I, §17. "In all controversies at law respecting
property, the ancient mode of trial by jury . . . ought to remain sacred and in-

violate." N. C. CoNsr. Art. I, §19.
'3 BL. Comm. *352.

'N. C. GEN. STAr. (1943)

§9-1.
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which authorizes the jury list to be selected from the names of (a) any
such persons as have paid the taxes assessed against them for the preceding year, and (b) who are men of good moral character and sufficient
intelligence; and the statute 5 which holds that "... every word importing the masculine only shall extend and be applied to females as well
as males unless the context clearly shows to the contrary ... ", were

not pertinent because the Constitutional provisions showed a contrary
intent. (3) If women were allowed to serve on juries, it would lead to
an innovation in the practical administration of both state and federal
courts which "... . might endanger or prevent this excellent institution

of the jury system from its usual course." 6 (4) The Nineteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution eliminated discrimination
in the rights of citizens to vote because of sex, but has no bearing on
the right to jury service. (5) The statute7 which declares, "...
juror... shall when applied to the holder of such office, or occupant of
such position, be words of common gender and they shall be a sufficient
designation of the person holding such office or position, whether the
holder be man or woman," deals only with titles or designations and
not with the qualifications of the offices or positions mentioned therein.
(6) No decisions to the contrary have been found where there are
similar constitutional and statutory provisions to those of North Carolina.
Justice Devin dissented on the grounds that: (1) The word "men"
used in the Constitution should be interpreted in the generic sense to
include women. (2) The statute,8 which was in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, can be imputed to the knowledge of
the framers of the Constitution. (3) The language of the Constitution
should be given an elastic interpretaioti in keeping with the progress
of human thought and the changing social conditions. (4) The Legislature, following the giving of equal.suffrage to women, declared that
the word "juror," as used in the stautes, included women;9 and the
Attorney General, (the present Mr. Justice Seawell), later handed down
an opinion stating women were not disqualified for service on jurieslo*
Old.
(1). 224 N. C. 581, 587, 31 S. E. (2d) 858, 862 (1944).
'State§12-3
v. Emery,
7N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3(13).
' See note 5 supra.
9See note 7 supra.
1o, Memorandum to Hon. J. Clyde Stancill, County Attorney, Charlotte, N. C.,
October 5, 1937. Eligibility of Women to Serve on furies of North Carolina..
"It is believed that the legislative history of North Carolina with respect to the
importance of the civil and political status of women, and the peculiar integration
and sequence of our constitutional provisions relating to suffrage, office holding,
and citizenship, through which the 19th Amendment directly operates, will fully
justify our court in holding that women are now eligible for jury service (without any further statutory enactment), thus removing the last vestige of political
inequality with men." (p. 2). "To say that when our statute was enacted the
word 'person' meant a 'male person' is not accurate. It never meant that, there or
elsewhere. All that could be said is that on account of constitutional inhibitions,
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As a result of this, women served on juries in North Carolina; and, if
it were so held in this case, it would effect no change but would rather
give added authority to a practice already grown up.
Justice Seawell reiterated in part the opinion of Justice Devin and
added the following points: (1) The Constitution did not plainly say
a jury of males as it did in conferring the right of suffrage, which suggests that "... if there was any ideology on the subject, it was activated
only in the common law, not in the Constitution, and should disappear
when the disqualifications finding expression in the common law had
been removed."' '
(2) Many courts and many states by statute have
now made women eligible for jury duty, and this has been accomplished
generally without constitutional amendment.
Legislation on the subject of women jurors falls into three classifications: (a) those that expressly exclude women, (b) those that expressly include women, and (c) those that are ambiguous and need
interpretation.
Thirteen states and the Territory of Hawaii expressly exclude
women by statute.1 2* All of these, except New Hampshire, declare that
only a "male" citizen is qualified to be a juror. New Hampshire words
its statute, as follows: "The burden of jury duty shall not be imposed
upon women, and their names shall not be put in the lists by town

officers."'

8

Eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of
Alaska allow women to serve on juries by express statutory provision.14*
it could not be made at any time applicable to women. Of course, if one desired
to lay a ghost or remove a mere mental obsession, the law might plainly state
that females are included. The word 'person,' however, has a continuing life
and must be construed to mean women as well as men when other parts of the
law permit this common sense application to be made: and, in this instance, there
is no occasion for placing the word 'person' in a legalistic straight jacket." (p. 12).
11 State v. Emory, 224 N. C. 581, 595, 31 S. E. (2d) 858, 867 (1944).
2*Amz.

CODE ANN. (1939) §37-102; CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 95,

§1; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) §40.01 (Failure to allow women to be jurors has
denied the plaintiff equal protection of law as given by the 14th Amendment.
Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939).); Miss. CODE ANN. (Rice &
Etheridge, 1942) §1762; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) p. 4690, §8746; N. H. Rzv.
LAWS

(1942)

c. 375, §29; N. MEX. STAT. ANN. (1941)

§30-101; OxLA. STAT.

ANN. (Supp. 1944) tit. 38, §10; S. D. CODE (1939) §32.10; TENN. CoDE ANX.
(Williams, 1934) §10006; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942)
§5984; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §5261; Wyo. REv.
STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §61-201 (McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac.
292 (1892) upheld the constitutionality of -this statute.); HAWAII R-v. LAWS
(1935) §3710.
18
N. H. Rv. LAws (1942) c. 375, §29.
14
*CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §1401e; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §4721-2:
"All persons qualified to vote at the general election shall be liable to serve as
jurors... ! "Whenever any Grand or Petit Jury in this state shall be composed
of both men and women and shall retire from, the Court room for deliberation,
the Court shall appoint two bailiffs. . . ."; IDAHO SEssioN LAws (1943) c. 158
(Prior to this statute, State v. Kelley, 39 Idaho 668, 229 Pac. 659 (1924), con-
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Five states by judicial decision have construed their statutes to be
applicable only to men. In Georgia a statute reads: "... . selection of
the most experienced... men to serve as grand jurors ... as traverse
jurors."'15 The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the statute was not
unconstitutional and that women could not be jurors.-6 In Idaho "A
person is competent to act as a juror if he be: (1) A Citizen of the
United States and an elector of the county. . .. ,117 It was held that
the use of the pronoun "he" controlled over the broader term "persons,"
thereby excluding women.18 A Massachusetts statute provides: "A
person qualified to vote for representatives to the general court .. .
shall be liable to serve as jurors. .
".."19
The Court held that these
words were broad enough to include women; but, when connected with
the history of the times and system, it would seem that it was not so
2
intended.2 0 Ten years later the case of Commonwealth v. Welosky l
substantiated this opinion. In South Carolina a constitutional provision
says: "The Petit jury of the Circuit Courts shall consist of twelve men
strued a previous statute, which said a jury was a body of men, to include
women.); Iu. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1942) c. 78, §25 (People v.
Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 22 N. E. (2d) 679 (1939) upheld the constitutionality of this
statute. A previous statute passed in 1929 was declared unconstitutional in People
v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. 108 (1931) ; accord, People v. Schraeberg, 347
Ill. 392, 179 N. E. 829 (1932).); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart., 1939) §1938
(Women must file applications for jury duty. State v. Bray, 153 La. 103, 95 So.
417 (1923) ; State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449 (1923).) ; ME. REV. STAT.
(1930) c. 120, §2; MINN. STAT. (Henderson, Kennedy & Scott, 1941) § 593.02;
Mont. Session Laws (1939) c. 203; Neb. Laws (1943) c. 45, legis. bill 82 (Women
are permitted to serve on juries provided the presiding district judge shall certify
that the accommodations and facilities of the court house of each county are such
as to permit women to serve, and such service shall be compulsory except for good
cause shown.); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2: 85-1 (cf. State v. James, 96 N. J. L.
132, 114 Atl. 553 (1921).); N. Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney) Civil Rights Law
(Supp. 1944) §13 (Gerry v. Volger, 252 App. Div. 217, 298 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th
Dep't 1937); cf. In Re Grilli, 110 Misc. 45, 179 N. Y. Supp. 795 (1920).) ; N. D.
Comp. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) §814; ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. (1940) §14-107
(State v. Chase, 106 Ore. 263, 211 Pac. 920 (1922).) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 17, §913: ". . . there shall be provided . . . a separate room or rooms
at or adjoining the court house ... for the comfort ... of women jurors... "'
(Commonwealth v. Valotta, 279 Pa. 84, 123 Atl. 681 (1924); Commonwealth v.
Garletto, 81 Pa. Super. 271 (1923).); R. I. Acts (1939) c. 700, §37: "Whenever the jury commissioner shall determine that the accommodations and facilities
of the superior court houses in any county are such as to allow of the service of
women as jurors, he shall certify of such facts to the secretary of state and shall
include women in the drawings made by him. . . ."; Vt. Laws (1941) no. 31,
§6; WAsiH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §89: "A jury is a body of
men. . . ." §95: ". . . women . . . shall not be compelled to serve as jurors . . .
Provided further, that any woman desiring to be excused from jury service may
claim exception by signing a written or printed notice thereof.... ."; D. C. CODE
(1940) tit. 11, §11-1418; ALASKA COmP. LAWs (1933) §1819 (Tynan v. U. S.,
297 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), held this act constitutional.).
"8GA. CODE ANN. (Park, Stillman & Strazier, 1936) tit. 2, §2-4502.
"7 Powers v. State, 172 Ga. 1, 157 S. E. 195 (1931).
' IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §2-201.
18

State v. Kelley, 39 Idaho 668, 229 Pac. 659 (1924).

18

MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 234, §1.

In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N. E. 685 (1921).

21276 Mass. 398, 177 N. E. 656 (1931).
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juror must be a qualified elector .... "22 In State v. Mittle2s
it was decided that, although each juror must be an elector, not every
qualified elector could be a juror. The Nineteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution did not give women the right to serve on juries.
In a Texas case,2 4 a statute saying "All men over twenty-one are
competent jurors ....-25 was construed as not using the word "men"
in the generic sense.
The status of four states apparently is still questionable. The Alabama Constitution states: ". . . the accused has a right to ... a speedy,
public trial by an impartial jury . ."26 and the Code section on challenges to the jury speaks of a juror as a "person." 2 7 In Arkansas, a
statute states: "A jury of twenty-four men, to be known as the petit
jurors ... shall be the regular jurors for trial of all jury cases .... 28
The Arkansas court2" refused to consider the competency of an indictment rendered by a grand jury on which there were two women, because of a statute prohibiting the quashing of an indictment on the
grounds of qualifications of jurors. No interpretations have been found
on either the Maryland or Wisconsin statutes. The Maryland statute
says: "No person shall be selected and placed upon a panel as a juror
who shall not have arrived at the age of twenty-five years." 80 The
Wisconsin provision is that: "All citizens of the: United States who are
qualified electors of this state . . . who are men of good character.
shall be liable to be drawn as jurors."'3:
Justice Seawell in his dissent in the instant case laid down a challenge to students of the law to investigate and contradict the statement
made by the majority that: "We have found no case, however, in a
state with constitutional and statutory provisions similar to ours, where
a contrary conclusion has been reached .... ,,82 Such investigation has
yielded three states whose decisions would apparently tend to contradict
the statements made by the majority. Not all of these states have
exactly the same wording as the pertinent Constitutional and statutory
provisions in North Carolina, but all are substantially similar.
In Iowa the Constitution provides that trial by jury shall remain
inviolate and that trial by jury of less than twelve men may be authorized.33 The statutory provision is that "All qualified electors...
...Each

2 S. C. CoNsT. Art.
23 120 S. C. 526, 113

V,

§21.

S. E. 335 (1922).
Tremont v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 572, 259 S. W. 583 (1924) ; accord, Glover
v. Cobb, 123 S. W. (2d) 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
11 TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) tit. 42, §2133.
2"

ALA. CoNsT. Art. I, §6.
7ALX. CODE
AK. Civ. CODE ANN. (Crawford, 1934) §342.

2"

28

29 Dickerson

ANN.

(Michie, 1940) §55.

v. State, 161 Ark. 60, 255 S.W. 873 (1923).

Art. 51, §1.
"Wis.
"State
v. Emery, 224 N. C. 581, 588, 31 S.E. (2d) 858, 868 (1944).
"IowA CoxsT. Art I, §9.
"MD.

ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939)
STAT. (1941) §255.01.
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are competent jurors . . ." ;4 yet decisions of the courts of that state
have held that women were eligible to be jurors since women were now
electors, despite the fact that the Constitution used the word "men." 35*
Here is seen a parallel conflict to *thatof North Carolina with the exception that Iowa uses the broad term "electors" in its statute while
North Carolina uses "persons" who have paid the taxes assessed.3 6
The Michigan Constitution mentions that trial by jury shall be inviolate37 and that a jury should consist of twelve men. 38 A statute of
that state provides that persons having the qualification of electors shall
be jurors ;39 and, despite the use of the word "men" in the Constitution,
women can serve on juries in that state. In People v. Barltz4 ° the
court said that the word "men" loses its significance and becomes that
of "juror."
Ohio follows Michigan in similarity both as to Constitutional 41 and
statutory provisions, 42 which have been interpreted to include women. 43
The situation in six other states 44* might be cited also in support
"IowA CODE (Reichmann,
"* State v. Hathaway, 224

1939) §10842.
Iowa 478, 276 N. W. 207 (1937) ; State v. Walker,
192 Iowa 823, 185 N. W. 619 (1921); accord, U. S. v. Roenig, 52 F. Supp.
(N. D. Iowa 1943) (Where the court held that the federal courts of the district
must follow the same jury system as the highest court of the state in which the
district lies.).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-1.
:7 Mict. CoNsr. Art. 1I, §13.
dd. §28.
MicE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1938) §27.246.
40212 Mich. 580, 180 N. W. 423 (1920) ; accord, People v. Merhige, 219 Mich.
95, 188 N. W. 454 (1922).
"OHIO CoNsT. Art. I, §1, Art. X, §5.
'OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §11419-9.
""Cleveland, C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wehmeier, 33 Ohio App. 475, 170
N. E. 27 (1929).
"'*

CmLIFORNiA CONST. Art. I, §7: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured
. . . the jury may consist of twelve . . "; and two statutes are: "A trial
is a body of persons .. " and ". . . a person is competent to act as juror if

to all

jury
he be: (1) a citizen of the United States.... " CAL. CODE CiviL PROC. (Deering,
1937) §§193, 198. Yet these provisions have been interpreted to include women.
U. S. v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. 105 (S. D. Cal. 1940) ; People v. Parman, 14 Cal.
(2d) 17, 92 P. (2d) 387 (1939); Ex Parte Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986
1918). However, it is to be noted that the California Constitution does not use
the word "men"
in reference to jury trial, as does the North Carolina Constitution, although the California statute uses the male pronoun "he" in conjunction
with the word "persons," thereby imputing the same idea as used in N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §9-1. The majority in the instant case cited People v. Lensen, 34
Cal. App. 336, 167 Pac. 406 (1917) as expressing the California view; but Justice
Seawell in his dissent pointed out that there were later California cases on the
matter.
The CONSTrruTioN OF INDIANA Art. I, §20 provides that jury trial shall remain
inviolate, and a statute says that a person must be a resident voter to be a juror.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §4-3317. Indiana cases have held that women
are jurors since the suffrage amendment. Johnson v. State, 201 Ind. 264, 167
N. E. 531 (1929) ; Moore v. State, 197 Ind. 640, 151 N. E. 689 (1926).

The

KAYNSAS CONST UTION

Art. I, §5 protects the inviolate right to trial by

jury, and the code provides for selection of jurors from persons having the qualifications of electors. KAN. GEa. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) §43-102. The Kentucky Constitution has the same provision as Kansas (BLL OF RIGHTS §7) and a
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of Justice Seawell's dissent; however, they are not quite as closely
parallel to the North Carolina situation.
It is to be noted that these three states, Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio,
with constitutional and statutory provisions similar to North Carolina,
have reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina without the benefit of two such enlightening provisions
as are found in the North Carolina statutes: ". . . every word importing
the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to females as
well as to males unless the context shows to the contrary" 45 and "juror"
should be a word of "common gender." 46
However, if these decisions are not of sufficient weight to have controlled the case of State v. Emery,47 as the instant case suggested, the
responsibility now lies upon the Legislature to instigate the appropriate
action to place North Carolina among those states which have women
on juries.
Judge Florence Allen, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, has aptly
summed up the view of the progressive states when she said: "Educated
women have more leisure, unless they have young children, than business men, and therefore we find them less apt to evade jury duty than
men of the same class. This means that in calling women to serve as
jurors new sources of intelligence are opened, and intelligence is surely
needed on a jury. The women on a jury follow the evidence as well
and are usually conscientious in the verdict. It is the general verdict
based upon their years of service that they will never 'play cards nor
throw -dice' to decide their vote. The women are not particularly sentimental. Neither are they heartless. They are much like men in their
usual reactions to evidence, but they are marked by a notable desire for
law enforcement. For my part, I believe that in the future we shall
owe much to the woman juror because of her respect for law and her
conscientious demand that society be protected and the rules of civilized
48
conduct upheld."
IDRIENNE E. LEVY
statute which says jurors are "persons." YEN. Ray. STAT. (1944) §29.030. But
cases in both states have held that exemption clauses do not render women incompetent to serve on juries if they choose to waive the privilege of exemption.
Moore v. Cass, 10 Kan. 220 (1872); Smith v. Rose, 224 Ky. 154, 5 S. W. (2d)

901 (1928).
NEVADA CoNsT. Art. I, §24 says that trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and
it is provided by statute that a juror must be a qualified elector. NEy. ComP.
LAWs (Hillyer, 1929) §8476. Here it ha's been held that the statute includes
women. Parus v. Dist. Ct., 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706 (1918); cf. Nev. Comp.

Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §8479 for when women can be exempt.
Utah is similiar to Kansas and Kentucky.
CODE ANN. (1940) §48-0-10.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3(1).

"Id. §12-3(13).

4 224 N. C. 581, 31 S. E. (2d) 858 (1944).
' Note (1923) 26 LAW NoTEs 224.

UTAH COxST. Art. I, §24; UTAH

